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The Medical Device Excise Tax: An Unfair Burden 
ELIZABETH M. BOLKA* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), also known as 
“Obamacare,” signed into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010,1 is a 
complex healthcare reform act that, together with the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act,2 substantially overhauls the U.S. healthcare system. The more 
than 900-page Act aims to reduce the cost of healthcare and improve healthcare 
coverage for all Americans.3  
In June 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the most 
controversial provision of the PPACA, the individual mandate,4 under Congress’s 
taxing power, but declared that the requirement that states either accept the 
expansion of Medicaid or lose their existing Medicaid funding was not a valid 
exercise of Congress’s spending power.5 With the upholding of the individual 
mandate, the likelihood that the PPACA’s provisions would all come into play 
became nearly certain, to the dismay of the law’s opponents. After President 
Obama’s reelection in November 2012, the PPACA’s implementation over the next 
few years became a reality.6  
                                                                                                                 
 
 * JD Candidate, 2014, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. 
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr3590enr/pdf/BILLS-111hr3590enr.pdf. 
 2. Health Care Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
 3. “The law allows Americans to make health insurance choices that work for them 
while guaranteeing access to care for our most vulnerable citizens, and provides new ways to 
bring down costs and improve quality of care.” Letter from Jim R. Esquea, Assistant Sec’y 
for Legislation, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to Lamar Alexander, Ranking Member, 
Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, U.S. Senate (June 3, 2013), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/LettertoAlexander.pdf. 
 4. PPACA § 1501(b), 42 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). The individual mandate requires that, 
beginning in 2014, all individuals maintain “minimum essential coverage, which includes 
eligible employer coverage, individual coverage, grandfathered plans, and federal programs 
such as Medicare and Medicaid, among others . . . [or] pay a penalty for noncompliance.” 
DAVID NEWMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41331, INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND RELATED 
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER PPACA 1–3 (2011), available at http://healthreformgps
.org/wp-content/uploads/CRSreportonPPACAug2011.pdf. This mandate has been the most 
controversial aspect of the healthcare reform to date. E.g., Wilton B. Hyman, An Explanation 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 579, 580 (2012); 
Perry W. Payne, Jr., The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 and the 
Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage (Individual Mandate): Constitutional 
Challenges and Potential Impact on Health Policy, 55 HOW. L.J. 937, 940 (2012); 
Christopher B. Serak, State Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: 
The Case for a New Federalist Jurisprudence, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 311, 314–15 (2012). 
 5. Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 6. See, e.g., Kate Pickert, What Obama’s Re-election Means for Health Care, 
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In addition to the mandates, subsidies, and tax credits designed to increase 
coverage, the PPACA necessarily includes a slew of revenue-generating provisions, 
including several new taxes and fees imposed on various sectors,7 to cover the new 
costs.8 One of the revenue-generating provisions that has garnered significant 
opposition from corporations and legislators is the new 2.3% manufacturer’s and 
importer’s medical device excise tax (MDET).9 This provision poses serious 
concerns in the eyes of medical device manufacturers who claim the amount of the 
tax is disproportionate to any expected increase in sales from the increased number 
of Americans receiving medical care.10 The manufacturers also vow that the tax, 
imposed on gross revenue rather than profits, will force them to cut substantial 
costs by decreasing expenditures on research and development (R&D), laying off 
workers, and shifting domestic production overseas.11 
Discussion of repeal of the MDET began almost as soon as the PPACA became 
law, and the medical device industry began throwing millions of dollars into 
lobbying for its repeal.12 Over the past two years a number of bills have been 
proposed in both the House and Senate to repeal the tax, and a repeal provision 
became a sticking point during the budget negotiations that led to a sixteen-day 
government shutdown in October 2013.13 Despite the significant news coverage 
surrounding the MDET, few Americans seem to understand what all the hype is 
about.  
This Note attempts to shed light on the MDET by examining its history, its 
technicalities, and the political arguments on both sides in depth. It then takes the 
position that even if manufacturers and lobbyists have exaggerated the negative 
effects of the tax, the MDET is still unwise tax and economic policy that never 
should have been implemented without more comprehensive research into the 
effects of the healthcare law on the medical device industry. The MDET imposes 
an unfair burden on manufacturers, hurts the economy by killing jobs in a 
high-paying industry, and stifles innovation by discouraging start-ups and driving 
up companies’ tax expenses. This Note urges Congress to repeal the MDET, or, in 
lieu of complete repeal, revise the tax to decrease the negative economic impact by 
making some modifications and future revisions such as exempting start-up 
                                                                                                                 
TIME.COM (Nov. 8, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/08/what-obamas-re-election
-means-for-health-care/#ixzz2BeJkAu5s (describing the Affordable Care Act as having a 
“more certain future under an Obama second term”). 
 7. Other beneficiaries of the PPACA who are required to pay additional fees include 
hospitals and health insurance providers. See infra notes 18–23 and accompanying text. 
 8. PPACA §§ 9001–9023 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.). 
 9. The MDET is codified at I.R.C. § 4191 (2012) and is occasionally referred to as 
section 4191. It was enacted by section 1405 of the HCERA, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029, 1064–65. 
 10. See infra notes 137–46 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra Part III.B. 
 12. See infra notes 31–33, 167–68. 
 13.  See, e.g., Greg Avery, Government Shutdown Deal Doesn’t Repeal Medical Device 
Tax, DENV. BUS. J. (Oct. 18, 2013, 2:14 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/denver
/blog/boosters_bits/2013/10/government-shutdown-deal-doesnt.html; DSWright, Durbin 
Offers Medical Device Tax Repeal To End Shutdown, FDL (Oct. 1, 2013, 8:26 AM), 
http://news.firedoglake.com/2013/10/01/durbin-offers-medical-device-tax-repeal-to-end
-shutdown/. 
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manufacturers, exempting certain uses that confer no direct benefit to the 
manufacturer, and revising the rate of tax as more information about the actual 
benefits received by manufacturers as a result of an increase in the number of 
insured Americans becomes available. These changes would represent a 
compromise between proponents of the tax and medical device manufacturers, who 
fear that the MDET, in the wake of an already difficult and uncertain regulatory 
environment, could force them to make major operating changes. This Note does 
not seek to opine on Obamacare as a whole or take a political stance on any 
issue—it merely examines, somewhat in a vacuum, this one component of the 
PPACA, the actual consequences of which are still unclear. 
Part I examines the legislative history and the goals of the MDET, including a 
discussion of the various forms the tax has taken. Part II delves into more detail 
about the mechanics of the MDET, focusing on which devices, which 
manufacturers, and which prices will be taxed. Part III examines the actual impact 
to date and the potential future impact of the tax on the medical device industry and 
the economy. It first provides background on the industry and then reviews studies 
on the MDET and actual steps companies have taken in preparation for or in 
response to the MDET. Part III then considers some of the counterarguments made 
by proponents of the PPACA who claim manufacturers are exaggerating the impact 
of the MDET. Part IV looks at the congressional response to the MDET, including 
a brief summary of the slew of bills that have been proposed to repeal the tax and 
the current political debate surrounding the tax. Finally, Part V argues that 
proponents of the MDET have incorrectly inflated the positive impact of the 
PPACA on the medical device industry and that the tax will force companies to 
either pass the tax on to the end consumer (typically the medical service provider) 
or cut spending by decreasing R&D, laying off workers, shifting production 
overseas, or decreasing planned hiring. This Note urges Congress to repeal the 
MDET because it is unwise tax policy that did not undergo the necessary review to 
make sure it was logical and fair and because it does not further the broad 
economic mission of getting Americans back to work.14 It then proposes that in lieu 
of complete repeal, members of Congress could work together to compromise in 
order to revise some of the most onerous provisions of the MDET to avoid losing 
more U.S. jobs, to avoid deterring start-ups’ innovations, and to make the tax 
burden match the benefits manufacturers might receive.  
I. THE BILL 
The MDET is one of many revenue-generating provisions included in the 
PPACA to help cover the costs of expanded health care coverage.15 The tax took 
effect on January 1, 2013,16 amid much debate about Obamacare and the “fiscal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Weekly Address: 
Creating Jobs and Getting All Americans Back to Work (Aug. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/08/06/weekly-address-creating-jobs-and
-getting-all-americans-back-work. 
 15. PPACA §§ 9001–23 (codified in scattered sections of I.R.C.). 
 16. I.R.C. § 4191 (2012).  
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cliff.”17 In order to provide a background setting for the debate surrounding the 
MDET, this Part examines the goals and legislative history behind inclusion of the 
MDET in the PPACA. 
A. The Path to the MDET 
The goal behind the MDET, like many of the other revenue-generating 
provisions in the PPACA, is to spread the cost of expanding health coverage among 
the government, individuals, and the corporate sectors that will benefit from it.18 It 
is one of many new taxes and fees imposed on various sectors of the healthcare 
industry. Other such taxes include a 40% excise tax on high-cost, 
employer-sponsored healthcare plans,19 a 10% excise tax on indoor tanning 
services,20 an annual fee on branded prescription pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
importers,21 and an additional unearned income Medicare contribution tax on 
high-income taxpayers,22 to name just a few.23  
The MDET has evolved significantly since it was first introduced. Originally, 
the tax was proposed as a $4 billion annual fee to be imposed on the medical device 
manufacturing sector and allocated according to market share.24 However, the 
medical device industry managed to halve the amount of revenue generation that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. “The ‘fiscal cliff’ is a term used to describe a bundle of momentous U.S. federal tax 
increases and spending cuts that are due to take effect at the end of 2012 and early 2013. In 
total the measures are set to automatically slash the federal budget deficit by $503 billion 
between FY 2012 and FY 2013, according to the most recent Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) projections. . . . The abrupt onset of such significant budget austerity in the midst of a 
still-fragile economic recovery has led most economists to warn of a double-dip recession 
and rising unemployment in 2013 if Washington fails to intervene in a timely fashion.”
Jonathan Masters, What Is the Fiscal Cliff?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.cfr.org/economics/fiscal-cliff/p28757. 
 18. See Letter from Charles N. Kahn III, President & CEO, Fed’n of Am. Hosps., Rick 
Pollack, Exec. Vice President, Advocacy & Pub. Policy, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Michael 
Rodgers, Senior Vice President, Pub. Policy and Advocacy, The Catholic Health Ass’n of 
the U.S., Curtis Rooney, President, Healthcare Supply Chain Org., & Deborah Sprindzunas, 
Exec. Dir., Ass’n for Healthcare Res. & Materials Mgmt., to I.R.S., at 2 (May 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2012/120508-cl-tax-med-dev.pdf 
[hereinafter Hosp. Ass’ns Letter] (“The concept of ‘shared responsibility’ for funding and 
implementing healthcare reform, among all population segments and affected economic 
interests, was a core element of the legislative bargain from the very beginning.”). 
 19. PPACA § 9001, I.R.C. § 4980I (2012). 
 20. PPACA § 9017, I.R.C. § 5000B (2012). 
 21. PPACA § 9008, 42 U.S.C. § 1395t (2012). 
 22. HCERA § 1402, I.R.C. § 1411 (2012). 
 23. For further discussion of the PPACA’s revenue-generating provisions, see Hyman, 
supra note 4, at 629–37. For an overview of all of the new tax provisions of the PPACA with 
links to more detailed discussion of each, see Affordable Care Act Tax Provisions, IRS.GOV, 
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Affordable-Care-Act-Tax-Provisions (last updated Feb. 28, 2014). 
 24. S. FIN. COMM., FRAMEWORK FOR COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH REFORM 18 (2009), 
available at http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2009/September/08/~/media/Images
/KHN%20Features/2009/Sep/08/090509baucus.ashx. 
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the tax would raise to $2 billion a year.25 The $2 billion fee included in the initial 
bill26 was to be allocated using a ratio of a covered entity’s gross receipts from 
medical device sales taken into account during the preceding calendar year to the 
aggregate gross receipts of all covered entities’ medical device sales during that 
year.27 If a covered entity’s aggregate gross receipts from medical devices were less 
than $5 million, the entity would not pay any portion of the fee.28 If the gross 
receipts were between $5 and $25 million, the entity would pay 50% of its 
allocated amount, and if the gross receipts exceeded $25 million, the covered entity 
would pay 100% of its allocated portion of the fee.29 This fee was to be treated as 
an excise tax for refund purposes.30 This original fee therefore hit large 
manufacturers heavily and did not reach the smaller industry participants. 
The fee evolved into an excise tax after much lobbying by the largest medical 
device manufacturers who claimed it was unfair.31 Upon rejection of the annual fee, 
Congress originally set the excise tax rate at 2.9%,32 but again under lobbyist 
pressure, Congress reduced it to the 2.3% now included in section 4191.33 The 
MDET is estimated to bring in about $29 billion over the ten-year span covering 
2013 to 2022, according to the Joint Committee on Taxation.34 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, EXCISE TAX ON 
MEDICAL DEVICES SHOULD NOT BE REPEALED: INDUSTRY LOBBYISTS DISTORT TAX’S IMPACT 
2 (2013). 
 26. PPACA § 9009, repealed by HCERA § 1405. 
 27. Id. § 9009 (a)–(b). 
 28. Id. § 9009(b)(2). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. § 9009(e). 
 31. See Medical Device Tax Hits Most of Health Care Industry, HEALIO ORTHOTICS & 
PROSTHETICS BUS. NEWS (June 2010), http://www.healio.com/orthotics-prosthetics/internal-
control/news/print/o-and-p-business-news/%7B6b3a12d2-dddb-45b5-bfff-a61664a0a1d1
%7D/medical-device-tax-hits-most-of-health-care-industry. 
 32. Id. Originally, only Class II and Class III devices were considered taxable medical 
devices. But when Congress lowered the rate during HCERA negotiations, it expanded the 
tax to apply to Class I devices as well in order to generate the required $20 billion in 
revenue. Id.; New Health Reform Law Expands Medical Device Excise Tax to Class I 
Devices, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF ORTHOTICS & PROSTHETICS (Apr. 2, 2010), 
http://www.naaop.org/alerts.asp?alert_id=10000714. 
 33. I.R.C. § 4191 (2012). 
 34. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF H.R. 436, THE “PROTECT MEDICAL 
INNOVATION ACT OF 2011,” JCX-45-12 (2012).  In March 2010 the committee estimated that 
the excise tax would raise $20 billion over the 2013–19 period.  The new $29 billion estimate is 
higher only because it covers three more years. Compare id., with JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO 
H.R. 4872, THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE 
REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 3590, THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
(‘PPACA’),” AS PASSED BY THE SENATE, AND SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE HOUSE 
COMMITTEE ON RULES ON MARCH 20, 2010, JCX-17-10 (2010). 
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B. Proposed and Final Regulations 
On December 27, 2010, the IRS published a notice requesting comments on the 
implementation and administration of the new tax.35 The IRS considered the many 
responses it received to this notice as well as its consultation with the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) in drafting proposed regulations, which were issued on February 3, 2012.36 
The proposed regulations were the only guidance medical device manufacturers 
had upon which to rely in preparing for the rapidly approaching start date of the tax 
until the IRS released final regulations on December 5, 2012.37 At that time, the 
IRS also released interim guidance related to determination of the sales price, 
treatment of convenience kits, and other topics reserved in the final regulations,38 as 
well as a set of frequently asked questions.39 To date, a number of unresolved 
questions exist about administration of the MDET. However, the IRS did provide 
some relief for medical device manufacturers by waiving the penalty for failure to 
make timely semimonthly deposits for the first three quarters of 2013 as long as the 
manufacturer or importer showed a good faith attempt to comply with the reporting 
requirements and the failure was not due to willful neglect.40 
II. THE MDET 
Section 4191 imposes a 2.3% tax on the sale price of “any taxable medical 
device by the manufacturer, producer, or importer.”41 But like most tax provisions, 
the meaning of this language is much more complicated than it appears. In order to 
understand the possible effects of the MDET, we must first take a detailed look at 
precisely what is included in the term “medical device,” who qualifies as a 
“manufacturer, producer, or importer,” and how the sales price is measured in sales 
between related parties. 
A. What Will Be Taxed? 
A “taxable medical device” is defined as “any device (as defined in section 
201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) intended for humans.”42 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. I.R.S. Notice 2010-89, 2010-52 I.R.B. 908.  
 36. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 48.4191-1 to -2, 77 Fed. Reg. 6028, 6035–37 (Feb. 7, 2012). 
 37. Taxable Medical Devices, 77 Fed. Reg. 72924, 72924–39 (Dec. 7, 2012) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 48), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-12
-07/pdf/2012-29628.pdf. 
 38. I.R.S. Notice 2012-77, 2012-52 I.R.B. 781. 
 39. Medical Device Excise Tax: Frequently Asked Questions, IRS.GOV, http://www.irs.gov
/uac/Medical-Device-Excise-Tax:-Frequently-Asked-Questions (last updated Feb. 3, 2014). 
 40. I.R.S. Notice 2012-77, supra note 38, § 6(b), at 785. 
 41. I.R.C. § 4191(a) (2012). 
 42. Id. § 4191(b)(1). Under the FFDCA, “device” is defined as an 
instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro 
reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or 
accessory, which is (1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the 
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IRS’s proposed and final regulations help clarify the statute, especially the 
definition of taxable medical device.43 The final regulations state that for purposes 
of the MDET, a “taxable medical device” is one that is listed by the FDA under 
section 510(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and 
21 C.F.R. part 807.44 The types of devices that fall under this description are varied 
and include items ranging from surgical gloves and dental instruments to coronary 
stents, pacemakers, defibrillators, and irradiation equipment.45 Device 
manufacturers are already familiar with these longstanding classifications and 
should know for the most part what devices fall within the definition. The 
regulations also state that if a device is not listed with the FDA currently, but is 
later determined to be a “device,” it will be considered a listed device with the FDA 
as of the date the FDA notifies the manufacturer or importer in writing of the 
change.46 
It is important to emphasize that this tax is a manufacturers’ excise tax imposed 
on the gross sales of manufacturers, producers, and importers, rather than their net 
profits.47 Therefore, even if a manufacturer makes no profit on the sale, it still has 
to pay the tax. But not every medical device sale is subject to the tax. First, like 
other excise taxes in the United States, taxable medical devices sold for use by the 
purchaser in further manufacture or for resale by the purchaser to a second 
purchaser for use in further manufacture are exempt.48 Second, devices exported 
outside of the United States or sold for resale by the purchaser to a second 
purchaser for export are exempt.49 Finally, section 4191 sets out a retail exemption 
                                                                                                                 
United States Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them, (2) intended for use in 
the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease, . . . or (3) intended to affect the structure or 
any function of the body . . . , and which does not achieve its primary intended 
purposes through chemical action within or on the body . . . and which is not 
dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended 
purposes. 
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2012). 
 43. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 48.4191-2(a), 77 Fed. Reg. 6028, 6035 (Feb. 7, 2012). 
 44. Id. 
 45. VAN DE WATER, supra note 25, at 2. 
 46. Treas. Reg. § 48.4191-2(a)(2) (2012). This provision is of specific concern to some 
critics who claim that mere notice from the FDA does not mean there has been a final 
determination that an item is required to be listed with the FDA, especially if appeals of the 
decision are ongoing. E.g., Letter from Alan Mertz, President, Am. Clinical Lab. Ass’n, to 
Steven T. Miller, Deputy Comm’r for Servs. & Enforcement, I.R.S., at 2, 5–6 (May 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.acla.com/sites/default/files/Comments%20re%20taxable%20medical
%20devices_1.pdf. Despite this criticism, the IRS declined to alter this provision in drafting the 
final regulations. T.D. 9604, 2012-52 I.R.B. 730, 732. 
 47. I.R.C. § 4191(a) (2012). 
 48. I.R.C. § 4221(a) (2012); see also Pia Flanagan, Health Care Reform Tax Provisions 
Affecting Large Employers, CORP. TAX’N, Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 5. Unlike other excise taxes 
though, the list of exemptions for the MDET has been shortened significantly to exclude the 
exemptions for supplies purchased for use on vessels or aircraft, items state and local 
governments purchase for their exclusive use, items nonprofit educational institutions 
purchase for their own use, and items purchased by qualified blood organizations for use in 
collecting, storing, or transporting blood. I.R.C. § 4221(a)(3)-(6). 
 49. I.R.C. § 4221(a); see also Flanagan, supra note 48. 
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for certain items that would otherwise fall under the FDA listing, including 
eyeglasses, contact lenses, hearing aids, and “any other medical device 
determined by the Secretary to be of a type which is generally purchased by the 
general public at retail for individual use.”50  
This final part of the retail exemption, stated in very broad terms, led to some 
confusion over exactly what type of items would be exempt. The IRS adopted a 
“facts and circumstances” approach that classifies a device as “generally 
purchased by the general public at retail for individual use” (i) if “it is regularly 
available for purchase and use by individual consumers who are not medical 
professionals,” and (ii) “if the design of the device demonstrates that it is not 
primarily intended for use in a medical institution or office or by a medical 
professional.”51 Because the medical device industry is ever evolving with new 
products constantly entering the market, most manufacturers, hospitals, and 
other industry participants favor the “facts and circumstances” approach taken 
by the IRS over other options, such as trying to create a list of devices that fall 
within the exemption.52 
The regulations give a nonexclusive list of factors to consider in determining 
whether a device is “available for purchase and use by individual consumers” 
that includes: (i) whether people can buy the items through retail businesses that 
sell items other than medical devices, such as drug stores and supermarkets; 
(ii) whether non-medical-professional consumers can safely and effectively use 
the device with little training; and (iii) whether the device is classified by the 
FDA as a “Physical Medicine Device.”53 The regulations also contain a 
nonexclusive list of factors to consider in determining whether the device’s 
design demonstrates that the device is not primarily intended for use in a 
medical office or institution or by medical professionals. These factors include: 
(i) whether the device generally must be implanted, inserted, operated, or 
otherwise administered by a medical professional; (ii) whether the initial 
investment or ongoing cost is too high for the average consumer; (iii) whether 
the device is classified as an FDA Class III device;54 (iv) whether the device is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. I.R.C. § 4191(b)(2). 
 51. Treas. Reg. § 48.4191-2(b)(2) (2012). 
 52. See, e.g., Christopher J. Ohmes & Michael Udell, Making Sense of the New Excise Tax 
on Medical Devices, 133 TAX NOTES 1015, 1016–17 (2011) (discussing the difficulties the IRS 
would have in administering a product exemption list that would need to include over 5600 
different products, with data about many of these products not publicly available); Richard T. 
Ainsworth, Andrew Schact, & Gail Wasylyshyn, Medical Devices Excise Tax (MDET)—A 
Market-Specific VAT? 5–6 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 12-30, 2012), 
available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/Ainsworth
RShactAWasylyshynG061812rev.pdf; Hosp. Ass’ns Letter, supra note 18; Letter from Stephen 
J. Ubl, President & CEO, AdvaMed, to Steven T. Miller, Deputy Comm’r for Servs. & 
Enforcement, I.R.S., at 1, 12 (May 3, 2012) [hereinafter AdvaMed Letter (May 3, 2012)] 
(thanking the IRS for rejecting a product exemption approach in the Proposed Regulations), 
available at http://www.advamed.org/NR/rdonlyres/37D7B123-68C3-4FBA-BA67-1918015
B4DD1/0/20120503AdvaMedFinalTaxComments.pdf. 
 53. Treas. Reg. § 48.4191-2(b)(2)(i) (2012). 
 54. Medical devices are classified as either Class I, II, or III, and the level of regulation 
increases from Class I to Class III. Class III devices require the highest level of regulatory 
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classified under certain parts or subparts of 21 CFR;55 and (v) whether the 
device qualifies as durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and 
supplies (DMEPOS), for which payment under Medicare Part B is available 
exclusively on a rental basis.56 Because the list is nonexclusive, there may be 
facts and circumstances related to either part of the test that could be relevant in 
determining whether a device qualifies for the retail exemption.57  
Finally, the regulations satisfied some complaints about uncertainty 
surrounding the tax by providing a “safe harbor” that assumes certain devices to 
be “generally purchased by the general public at retail for individual use.”58 The 
“safe harbor” list includes items such as over-the-counter devices in the relevant 
FDA classification regulation59 and devices that qualify as DMEPOS under the 
relevant sections for Parenteral and Enteral Nutrition and Durable Medical 
Equipment and Orthotic Devices, subject to certain requirements.60 
In addition to questions about what products fall under the retail exemption, 
manufacturers and industry groups are still left with questions about the 
taxability of specific items such as medical software licenses, donated medical 
devices, and medical convenience kits. The IRS addressed each of these topics 
in the interim guidance it issued along with the final regulations.61 Until the IRS 
issues further guidance, it will treat medical software licenses as leases of 
                                                                                                                 
controls and typically must go through a premarket approval process. For more information 
on FDA classifications, see Overview of Device Regulation, FDA, http://www.fda.gov
/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/default.htm. 
 55. Devices falling in these categories are primarily intended for use by medical 
professionals and include the following: 
21 CFR part 862 (Clinical Chemistry and Clinical Toxicology Devices), 21 
CFR part 864 (Hematology and Pathology Devices), 21 CFR part 866 
(Immunology and Microbiology Devices), 21 CFR part 868 (Anesthesiology 
Devices), 21 CFR part 870 (Cardiovascular Devices), 21 CFR part 874 (Ear, 
Nose, and Throat Devices), 21 CFR part 876 (Gastroenterology—Urology 
Devices), 21 CFR part 878 (General and Plastic Surgery Devices), 21 CFR part 
882 (Neurological Devices), 21 CFR part 886 (Ophthalmic Devices), 21 CFR 
part 888 (Orthopedic Devices), or 21 CFR part 892 (Radiology Devices). 
Treas. Reg. § 48.4191-2(b)(2)(ii)(D)(1) (2012).  
 56. Id. § 48.4191-2(b)(2)(ii). 
 57. In the tax directive included with the final regulations, the IRS reemphasized that other 
circumstances could be relevant and that the list is not a checklist of factors but a list of relevant 
factors that may or not apply in a given situation. T.D. 9604, 2012-52 I.R.B. 733–34. 
 58. Treas. Reg. § 48.4191(b)(2)(iii) (2012). 
 59. These include devices that are part of the FDA’s online IVD Home Use Lab Tests 
database, available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfIVD/Search.cfm, 
and devices described as “OTC” or “over the counter” in the FDA’s classification regulation 
heading, product code name, device classification name, or the “classification name” field in 
the FDA’s devices registration and listing database, available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov
/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfrl/rl.cfm. Treas. Reg. § 48.4191(b)(2)(iii)(A)–(C). 
 60. See id. § 48.4191(b)(2)(iii)(D). For example, payment must be available on a 
purchase basis under Medicare Part B payment rules. Prosthetics and orthotics must fit the 
definition in 42 C.F.R. § 414.202 and cannot require implantation or insertion by a medical 
professional, and parental and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies must fit the 
definition in 42 C.F.R. § 414.102(b). Id. 
 61. I.R.S. Notice 2012-77, supra note 38. 
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taxable medical devices as of the date the parties entered the lease agreement62 
and donations of taxable medical devices by the manufacturer to an eligible 
donee63 as nontaxable sales.64  
The taxability of “convenience kits,” or sets of two or more devices enclosed 
in a single package for the convenience of the healthcare professional, and 
whether the acts of “kitting” or sterilizing kits constitute “further 
manufacturing,” were topics of heated debate.65 Under section 201(h) of the 
FFDCA, many medical kits are listed as new or different medical devices, 
separate from the devices included in the kits.66 In other words, the kit assembler 
would be the “last manufacturer” rather than the manufacturer who produced the 
component medical device included in the kit.67  
Whether “kitting” is considered manufacturing can have a huge impact on the 
amount of tax revenue collected as well as from whom it is collected. After the 
IRS and Treasury Department promulgated the proposed regulations, many 
distributors worried that they would be taxed on “kitting” activities that consist 
merely of packing various taxable and nontaxable medical devices into kits, 
sometimes sterilizing them, and distributing them to hospitals and other users.68 
They submitted letters to the IRS explaining that taxing such activity as further 
manufacturing goes against the legislature’s intent and would likely result in 
double taxation of some items, taxation of some items that should be exempt, 
and the unintended taxation of a service where no new goods are 
manufactured.69 
Although the proposed regulations expressly stated that kit assembly 
qualified as further manufacturing,70 the IRS took into account the numerous 
letters and comments it received on the topic and reversed its position in the 
interim guidance it issued along with the final regulations.71 The interim rule 
satisfies many manufacturers and kit assemblers’ complaints by exempting 
domestically produced convenience kits from the tax and, instead, imposing the 
tax on the manufacturers who sell the component parts of the kits.72 Under the 
interim rule, sales of imported convenience kits will be taxed only on the price 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. Id. at 6. 
 63. An eligible donee is one described in section 170(c) of the Code. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See, e.g., Letter from Linda Rouse O’Neill, Vice President Gov’t Affairs, Health 
Indus. Distribs. Ass’n, to Douglas H. Shulman, Comm’r, I.R.S. (May 7, 2012) [hereinafter 
HIDA letter], available at http://www.hida.org/App_Themes/Member/docs/GA/Medical
%20Device%20Tax/HIDA_Medical-Device-Tax-IRS-Comments-FINAL_5-7-12.pdf; Hosp. 
Ass’ns Letter, supra note 18, at 8–9. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Ainsworth et al., supra note 52, at 10. 
 68. See, e.g., HIDA letter, supra note 65; Hosp. Ass’ns Letter, supra note 18. 
 69. See, e.g., HIDA letter, supra note 65; Leading Executives from Across the Country 
Urge the Senate to Repeal the Device Tax, MED. DEVICE MFRS. ASS’N (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.medicaldevices.org/news/news.asp?id=139148&hhSearchTerms=%22leahey
+and+letter%22. 
 70. Treas. Reg. § 4221-2(b) (2012). 
 71. I.R.S. Notice 2012-77, supra note 38. 
 72. Id. 
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allocable to the taxable devices in the kit.73 The IRS and Treasury Department 
plan to study further the taxability of convenience kits before releasing 
additional guidance,74 so although the present interim guidance is a small win 
for “kitters,” the long-term application of section 4191 to convenience kits 
remains uncertain. 
B. Who Will Be Taxed? 
Only the final manufacturer or importer will be taxed because there are 
exemptions for sales of devices sold for further manufacture or export.75 The 
definition of “manufacturer” is common for all excise taxes and includes “any 
person who produces a taxable article from scrap, salvage, or junk material, or 
from new or raw material, by processing, manipulating, or changing the form of 
an article or by combining or assembling two or more articles.”76 Manufacturers 
include producers and importers.77 For the MDET, manufacturers that fall under 
this definition are generally those that must register as medical device 
manufacturers with the FDA.78  
Who will be liable for the MDET is a question of major concern because not 
only do manufacturers and importers have the burden of paying the tax, they 
also take on an enormous administrative burden in implementing the appropriate 
systems to track and pay the tax. Various hospital associations expressed 
concern in a letter regarding the proposed regulations about the problems 
associated with hospitals being taxed as importers.79 Under the current law, 
hospitals indeed qualify as importers if they purchase medical devices from 
abroad. The various hospital associations stated that hospitals are unfamiliar 
with excise taxes and do not have the administrative capability at this time to 
implement such a tracking and payment process.80  
The administrative burden is not unique to hospitals though. All 
manufacturers will bear significant and unpredictable costs in addition to the 
2.3% tax on sales due to the cost of implementing the MDET, including the 
costs of developing or purchasing new information technology software to deal 
with tracking the taxable devices and reporting the tax to the IRS A December 
2012 survey of eighty-one medical device companies of varying sizes conducted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 73. Id.; see also Grant Thornton, IRS Finalizes Rules for Medical Device Excise Tax, 
MONDAQ (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/212332/sales+taxes+VAT
+GST /IRS+Finalizes+Rules+For+Medical+Device+Excise+Tax.  
 74. I.R.S. Notice 2012-77, supra note 38. 
 75. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 76. Treas. Reg. § 48.0-2(a)(4)(i) (2012). 
 77. Id. 
 78. FFDCA § 510, 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)–(d), (i), (j) (2012); 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.20,.21 
(2013) (requiring establishments that manufacture, prepare, propagate, compound, assemble, 
process, repackage, or relabel medical devices to register their establishments and list the 
devices intended for sale upon first beginning operation, and requiring them to update this 
list annually). 
 79. E.g., Hosp. Ass’ns Letter, supra note 18, at 9. 
 80. Id. 
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by the Advanced Medical Technology Association (AdvaMed)81 revealed that 
implementation of MDET solutions will cost the medical device industry an 
estimated $400 to $667 million.82 Such expected costs make it even more 
important for industry participants to know whether their activities subject them 
to the MDET so they can put in place the necessary systems to properly comply. 
Although the MDET applies to manufacturers and importers, nothing in the 
statute prohibits these manufacturers from passing some, or all, of the burden of 
the tax on to healthcare providers. This was a major concern for hospital 
associations, which recommended in their comment letter regarding the 
proposed regulations that the IRS should expressly prohibit medical device 
manufacturers from passing the tax on to healthcare providers, thereby escaping 
the manufacturers’ portion of the “shared responsibility” of healthcare reform 
and receiving a windfall.83 Congress did not adopt this recommendation in the 
final regulations, however, and since the implementation of the tax, it is clear 
that at least some manufacturers are passing the tax directly on to healthcare 
providers.84 The ability to pass the tax on as a line-item charge further 
complicates the question of which institutions are really going to bear the 
burden of the MDET.85 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. AdvaMed is an industry group that “advocates on a global basis for the highest 
ethical standards, timely patient access to safe and effective products, and economic policies 
that reward value creation.” About AdvaMed, ADVAMED, http://advamed.org/page/56
/about-advamed. The group has been very outspoken against the MDET and has conducted 
several studies on its impact. See Medical Device Tax, ADVAMED, http://advamed
.org/issues/19/medical-device-tax. 
 82. ADVANCED MED. TECH. ASS’N, MDET SURVEY RESULTS: UNDERSTANDING THE TRUE 
IMPACT OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE EXCISE TAX (MDET) (2012) [hereinafter ADVAMED SURVEY, 
Dec. 2012]; Device Makers Need Many Months, Millions of Dollars To Figure Out Medtech 
Tax Compliance, MASSDEVICE (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.massdevice.com/news/device
-makers-needs-many-months-millions-dollars-figure-out-medtech-tax-compliance. 
 83. Hosp. Ass’ns Letter, supra note 18, at 2–7. 
 84. The Healthcare Supply Chain Association (HSCA) launched a website called Medical 
Device Tax Watch “to serve as a clearinghouse of information for its hospital and healthcare 
provider partners on the medical device excise tax (MDET), and to gather information and 
create awareness of medical device industry efforts to pass the costs of the device tax on to 
American hospitals and other health care providers.” About, MED. DEVICE TAX WATCH, 
http://www.devicetaxwatch.com/p/about.html. HSCA has posted a list of thirty-nine suppliers 
who are shifting the burden directly to providers. Cost-Shifting Suppliers, MED. DEVICE TAX 
WATCH, http://www.devicetaxwatch.com/p/cost-shifting-suppliers.html. 
 85. Economist Kyle Pomerleau of the Tax Foundation, a nonpartisan research 
organization that has monitored fiscal policy since 1937, noted that “the market power of 
hospitals could undercut the ability of device manufacturers to pass on much of the cost of 
this tax in the long run,” especially in an industry such as the medical device industry that is 
composed of small firms lacking in bargaining power. KYLE POMERLEAU, TAX FOUND., 
FISCAL FACT NO. 364: THE ACA MEDICAL DEVICE TAX: BAD POLICY IN NEED OF REPEAL 3 
(2013), available at http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/ff364.pdf. 
Proponents of the MDET also recognize the likely inability of manufacturers to pass off the 
whole cost of the MDET to purchasers, but they indicate this is a good thing. See VAN DE 
WATER, supra note 25, at 6. 
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C. What Sales Price Will Be Taxed? 
Under the MDET, what the sales price of a medical device includes can make 
a huge difference in the tax’s implications. Recognizing “that the medical device 
industry encompasses a diverse group of manufacturers that produce a broad 
range of articles” and that the medical device industry uses a wide array of 
distribution chains, the IRS and the Treasury Department have requested 
additional comments on how best to determine the constructive sales price of 
items sold to related parties.86 Under the interim rules issued along with the final 
regulations, the IRS provided five distribution scenarios with guidance about 
how to calculate the sale price. The table below summarizes these interim 
rules87: 
 
Table 1. Interim Sales Price Rules 
 
 
Distribution Chain Constructive Price Interim Rule 
 
 
Sales at retail (to unrelated end users); 
no regular sales to independent 
wholesale distributors 
75% of the actual selling price after 
taking into account adjustments 
provided by section 4216(a)
  
Sales to unrelated retailers; no regular 
sales to independent wholesale 
distributors
90% of the lowest price for which 
articles are sold to unrelated retailers, 
without adjustment for any exclusion 
  
Sales to related retailers; no regular 
sales to independent wholesale 
distributors
75% of the product of 95% and the 
actual selling price88 
  
Sales to related resellers that lease and 
sell at retail to unrelated end users
75% of the product of 95% and the 
actual selling price89
  
Sales to related resellers that only lease 
at retail; no regular sales to independent 
wholesale distributors 
Actual selling price to related reseller, 
provided it reasonably approximates 
actual fair market price of the article 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 86. I.R.S. Notice 2012-77, supra note 38, § 3, at 782. 
 87. The table above is a concise summary of the IRS’s interim guidance regarding 
constructive sale price. Id. at 782–83. 
 88. “The 5% discount is an allowance for the exclusions from the selling price otherwise 
allowed under § 4216(a). See Rev. Rul. 82-211. The additional 25% discount adjusts the 
selling price to approximate the selling price to an independent wholesale distributor. See 
Rev. Rul. 80-273.” Id. at 783. 
 89. Id. 
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In order to maximize revenues and maintain consistency with other manufacturers’ 
excise taxes, the sales price cannot be reduced for discounts or rebates,90 and the 
price will include costs of packaging, shipping, and warranties.91  
III. POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MDET 
Along with leaving some outstanding administrative questions unresolved, as 
noted in the previous Part, the MDET also carries with it the potential of hurting 
the medical device industry. This in turn may harm the U.S. economy, as medical 
device manufacturers are forced to cut costs by slashing jobs, moving jobs 
overseas, and decreasing spending on R&D. Manufacturers may also simply pass 
the tax on to customers (typically hospitals), further burdening that sector and 
forcing it to foot an even greater portion of the PPACA’s revenue requirements.92 
This Part describes the potential impact of the MDET on medical device 
manufacturers and on the U.S. economy as a whole. First, it looks at the U.S. 
medical device industry and the problems it faces today. Then, it examines the 
arguments both for and against the tax by looking at studies and actual responses 
by various corporations.  
A. The Medical Device Industry 
The medical device sector is one of the United States’ strongest industries and is 
one of very few sectors that exports more than it imports.93 It employs over four 
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. The IRS decided not to adopt the recommendations of AdvaMed and others to allow 
rebates to be taken into account in calculating the sales price. See AdvaMed Letter (May 3, 
2012), supra note 52, at 8–10 (explaining how common volume and other discounts and 
rebates are in the medical device industry and how they are often provided pursuant to 
contract and thus treated as excludible purchase price adjustments for federal income tax and 
accounting purposes); T.D. 9604, 2012-52 I.R.B. 730, 738 (declining to adopt the 
recommendation and providing that “a manufacturer may take a rebate into account in 
determining sale price only to the extent the rebate is made prior to the close of the quarter 
during which the sale associated with the rebate is made”). 
 91. Mitchell Kopelman & Ori Epstein, Medical Device Tax 101, MED. DEVICE & 
DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.mddionline.com/article/medical
-device-tax-101. 
 92. Apart from the medical device tax, hospitals have already begun reacting to 
Obamacare by laying off large numbers of their workforce. For example, in the fall of 
2013, Indiana University Health (IUH) laid off more than 800 employees. IUH and other 
hospitals across the country cite the new health care law as a key reason, but also point to 
decreased Medicaid funding, decreased inpatient stays, an aging population, and lower 
reimbursement rates as causes for the layoffs. See, e.g., Paul Davidson & Barbara Hansen, 
Hospitals Reducing Payrolls, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 2013, at 1B; Kimberly Leonard, Is 
Obamacare to Blame for Hospital Layoffs?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 20, 2013), 
http://health.usnews.com/health-news/hospital-of-tomorrow/articles/2013/09/20/is
-obamacare-to-blame-for-hospital-layoffs-is-obamacare-to-blame-for-hospital-layoffs. 
 93. Letter from eighteen U.S. Democratic senators to Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. 
Senate (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents
/MedDeviceLetter12102012.pdf. 
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hundred thousand Americans directly and an estimated two million indirectly.94 
These jobs typically pay about 40% above average wages.95 Furthermore, the 
medical device sector invests significant resources in innovation, increasing R&D 
investment by 9% from 2007 to 2009.96 
Small, innovative companies fuel the industry, with 80% of medical technology 
companies having fewer than fifty employees and 98% having fewer than five 
hundred employees.97 Medical device development is extremely capital intensive 
and risky due to the long product development cycles—typically seven to ten 
years—required for research and clinical studies, manufacturing, and product 
launch.98 Companies must also deal with a very complex regulatory environment 
both in the United States and worldwide. 
The medical device regulatory environment in the United States is extremely 
complicated, and companies must obtain approval for new devices from the FDA 
through a series of difficult filings, clinical trials, and plant audits.99 Often, 
companies with novel developments do not have clear regulatory guidance on the 
process,100 thus delaying and further complicating introduction of the device to the 
market. Companies must also convince the CMS to cover or reimburse consumers 
for the cost of the devices, often without clear guidance or protocol for keeping the 
FDA and CMS on similar tracks.101 
The industry has experienced significant growth in recent years despite a 
difficult economic environment; however, the U.S. regulatory scheme, worldwide 
competition, and now the MDET create considerable barriers to continued growth 
in the United States, and some analysts question whether the United States can 
maintain its dominance in the industry with the upcoming changes.102 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Yair Holtzman, The U.S. Medical Device Industry in 2012: Challenges at Home and 
Abroad, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY (July 17, 2012), http://www.mddionline.com
/article/medtech-2012-SWOT. 
 95. LEWIN GRP., STATE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 8 
(2010), available at http://www.lewin.com/~/media/lewin/site_sections/publications
/stateeconomicimpactofthemedicaltechnologyindustry61510.pdf. 
 96. Holtzman, supra note 94. 
 97. Letter from more than 800 companies and groups to Senators Harry Reid, Richard 
Durbin, Mitch McConnell & Jon Kyl (Nov. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from 800 groups], 
available at http://www.azbio.org/pinniped/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2012-11-13-device
-tax-letter-to-senate-leadership.pdf; see also MED. DEVICE MFRS. ASS’N & NAT’L VENTURE 
CAPITAL ASS’N, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND VENTURE CAPITAL: A FRUITFUL YET FRAGILE 
ECOSYSTEM 2 (2009). 
 98. MED. DEVICE MFRS. ASS’N & NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 97, at 13. 
 99. Id. at 14. The basic requirements include establishment registration, medical device 
listing, premarket notification (510(k)) or premarket approval (PMA), investigational device 
exemption (IDE) for clinical studies, quality system (QS) regulation, labeling requirements, and 
medical device reporting (MDR). Medical Devices: Overview of Device Regulation, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/default.htm 
(last updated Mar. 5, 2013). 
 100. MED. DEVICE MFRS. ASS’N & NAT’L VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, supra note 97, at 14. 
 101. Id. at 14–15. 
 102. See, e.g., Holtzman, supra note 94. 
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B. Negative Economic Effects 
The MDET adds one more problem to those faced by the medical device 
manufacturing sector today. Manufacturers and other opponents of the MDET 
claim that it is an “egregious job-killing tax[]”103 that will “destroy jobs and stifle 
innovation”104 because in order to pay for this new tax, medical device 
manufacturers will have to cut costs and, therefore, jobs and R&D expenditures. In 
one of the strongest job-producing industries in the nation, the anticipated job loss 
could be devastating for the economy.105 Furthermore, some argue that the effects 
will be felt the most by smaller manufacturers and start-ups because these 
manufacturers typically offer products at very low profit margins or are already 
operating at a loss.106 Unfortunately, it is these small manufacturers who develop 
most of the new innovations and life-saving products that keep the medical device 
industry flourishing.107 
Opponents argue that medical device manufacturers will move jobs offshore in 
order to cut costs.108 The trade association for medical device manufacturers, 
AdvaMed, commissioned a study in 2011 to examine the likely impacts of the 
MDET, which found that “[u]nder reasonable assumptions, the tax could result in 
job losses in excess of 43,000 and employment compensation losses in excess of 
$3.5 billion.”109 Cook Medical Chairman Steve Ferguson indicated that the effects 
will likely be even more drastic.110 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. 158 CONG. REC. H3584 (daily ed. June 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. Black). 
 104.  Devon Herrick, The Job-Killing Medical Device Tax, ISSUE BRIEFS (Nat’l Ctr. for 
Policy Analysis, Dall., Tex.), Feb. 2012, at 1, available at http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs
/ib106.pdf; see also Ramesh Ponnuru, Put Simply, the New Medical-Device Tax Will Steal 
Jobs, STAR TRIB., Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries
/136625483.html.  
 105. See Herrick, supra note 104, at 2–3. 
 106. See, e.g., MassDevice Staff, Medical Device Tax Would Mostly Hit the Biggest 
Firms, MEDCITY NEWS (Mar. 24, 2010, 12:22 PM), 
http://medcitynews.com/2010/03/medical-device-tax-would-mostly-target-the-biggest-
companies/ (“The tax’s impact on smaller firms might be more pronounced.”). 
 107. See Alan Kahn, The Dynamics of Medical Device Innovation: An Innovator’s 
Perspective, in THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY 89, 90–91 (Annetine 
C. Gelijns & Ethan A. Halm eds., 1991); Mind Control or Design Control, HEALING 
INNOVATION (Oct. 2, 2012), http://healinginnovation.com/2012/10/02/mind-control-or
-design-control/. 
 108. E.g., DIANA FURCHTGOTT-ROTH & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, EMPLOYMENT 
EFFECTS OF THE NEW EXCISE TAX ON THE MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY 2 (2011) [hereinafter 
ADVAMED STUDY, Sept. 2011], available at http://heartland.org/sites/default/files/090711
employmenteffectoftaxonmedicaldeviceindustryfinal.pdf. 
 109. Id. at 2. Some argue that this study and the study commissioned by AdvaMed in 
2012 are not credible. E.g. Christopher Flavelle, Expert Briefing: Medical Device Tax, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 26, 2012, at B15. 
 110. See SCOTT NELSON, MEDSIDER, WILL THE MEDICAL DEVICE TAX FORCE YOU TO THE 
UNEMPLOYMENT LINE? (2012), available at http://medsider.com/wp-content/uploads
/transcriptions/SteveFerguson_MedsiderInterviews_2012.pdf. 
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Recent business decisions by medical device manufacturers provide significant 
support for the arguments that the MDET will result in job loss or stunted hiring. In 
the two years leading up to the tax’s implementation, a number of manufacturers 
began to find ways to cut costs in preparation. In the latter part of 2012, the medical 
device industry eliminated thousands of jobs, with many employers pointing to the 
medical device tax as a significant factor behind their layoffs.111 In November 2011, 
device maker Stryker Corporation announced that it would cut five percent of its 
global workforce, citing preparation for the MDET as a main reason.112 Similarly, in 
September 2012, Welch Allyn announced a number of changes it planned to put in 
place to “proactively prepare the company to address the onerous U.S. 
medical-device tax.”113 These changes include reducing its 2750-person workforce by 
ten percent over the next three years, closing its manufacturing plant in Beaverton, 
Oregon, and consolidating its North American operations in Tijuana, Mexico.114  
Cook Medical, the largest privately owned medical device manufacturer in the 
United States, has taken a more vocal stance against the tax than some of the larger 
public companies.115 Cook cited the MDET as the reason why it decided to shelve 
its plans to roll out five new plants across the Midwest over the next five years, 
having estimated that the new tax will cost the company between $20 and 
$30 million annually.116 Cook stated that it had hoped to be able to expand 
manufacturing facilities to small U.S. towns that were hit hard by job loss, but with 
the new MDET, Cook is forced to shift its focus on future growth overseas.117  
In addition to Stryker, Welch Allyn, and Cook, other manufacturers such as 
NuVasive118 and St. Jude Medical119 have cited the MDET as a reason behind 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. Layoffs: Medical Device Companies Cut 2,000 Jobs in 2 Months, MASSDEVICE 
(Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.massdevice.com/news/layoffs-medical-device-companies-cut
-2000-jobs-2-months. 
 112. Press Release, Stryker Corp., Stryker Announces Actions to Drive Over $100 Million in 
Annual Productivity Gains (Nov. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Stryker Press Release], available at 
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=118965&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1629222. 
 113. Mike Verespej, Welch Allyn Shifting Work Abroad, Blames Pending Medical-Device 
Tax, PLASTICSNEWS.COM (Sept. 17, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.plasticsnews.com
/article/20120917/NEWS/309179973. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Press Release, Cook Med., Cook Medical Urges House of Representatives and 
Senate to Support Repeal of Medical Device Tax (June 4, 2012), available at 
https://www.cookmedical.com/web/newsroom/article/-/blogs/cook-medical-urges-house-of
-representatives-and-senate-to-support-repeal-of-medical-device-tax. For an interesting 
interview with the Cook Group’s chairman, see NELSON, supra note 110. 
 116. J.K. Wall, Cook Medical Shelves Midwest Expansion Plans, IBJ.COM (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.ibj.com/cook-medical-shelves-midwest-expansion-plans/PARAMS/article/35735. 
 117. Id. 
 118. NuVasive, a company that produces implants and invasive disks that surgeons can 
fit into a person’s spine to deal with severe back pain, states that the MDET will cost it about 
$12 million, reducing its operating profit by fourteen percent and potentially resulting in 
elimination of over one hundred highly skilled jobs. Federal Policies Affecting Innovation 
and Job Growth in the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industries: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter Lukianov statement] , 
available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/4-21-11_Lukianov_SD
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cutting jobs or shifting production overseas. A December 2012 AdvaMed survey of 
eighty-one medical device manufacturers indicates that approximately “62 percent 
of the companies expect to include layoffs or reduced hiring as part of their 
response to the tax.”120 
One of the most concerning effects of the MDET is the potential for it to further 
decrease innovation in an industry already experiencing a decline in venture capital 
funding and other difficulties due to regulatory uncertainty.121 Medical device 
innovation is part of a long-term solution to reducing healthcare costs. A large 
study conducted by researchers and a coalition of seven leading healthcare 
organizations found that advances and innovation in healthcare from 1980 to 2000 
produced health gains (based on a number of factors such as death and disability 
rates, hospital stay days, and life expectancies) of $2.40 to $3.00 for each dollar 
spent on healthcare.122 The majority of medical device innovations come from 
small companies, often start-ups with a new idea. A survey of ninety-eight medical 
device start-up executives found that thirty-eight percent plan to foot at least some 
of the cost of the tax by decreasing investment in R&D.123 By creating another 
obstacle to entry into the market, the MDET has the potential to deter companies 
from investing in medical device innovation. This effect ultimately hurts patients 
and inhibits the United States from maintaining its leading position in the medical 
device industry. Decreased investment in R&D, layoffs, hiring freezes, and 
movement overseas indicate that the MDET could have grave consequences for one 
of America’s leading industries. 
                                                                                                                 
_Testimony.pdf (statement of Alex Lukianov, Chairman & CEO, NuVasive, Inc.); see also 
About Us, NUVASIVE, http://www.nuvasive.com/about-us/. 
 119. St. Jude Medical laid off about eight hundred workers from August to November of 
2012 as part of a companywide reorganization designed to cut $50 to $60 million in costs in 
2013. Although the company stated that the MDET is just one of many factors that 
contributed to the layoffs, the amount of cost savings for 2013 is very close to what company 
executives anticipate paying for the MDET. James Walsh, St. Jude Cutting Another 500 
Jobs; Med-Tech Company Laid Off 300 People in August, STAR TRIB., Nov. 2, 2012, at 1A. 
 120. ADVAMED SURVEY, Dec. 2012, supra note 82. 
 121. See Joseph Walker, Funding Dries Up for Medical Startups, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 
2013, 7:58 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304470504579
164122110690860. 
 122. VALUE GRP., THE VALUE OF INVESTMENT IN HEALTH CARE 2 (2004), available at 
http://www.aha.org/content/2004/pdf/Value_Report.pdf (“The study suggests that the value 
of improved health in the U.S. population over the past 20 years significantly outweighs the 
additional health care expenditures that accompanied the improvements.”). The study 
specifically looked at four conditions that are among the most common causes of death and 
disability—heart attack, type 2 diabetes, stroke, and breast cancer—and sought to quantify in 
dollar terms the total value of investment (VOI) in health care expenditures. Id.  
 123. Arezu Sarvestani, Survey: Medtech Startups Respond to the Medical Device Tax, 
MASSDEVICE (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.massdevice.com/news/survey-medtech
-startups-respond-medical-device-tax. Additionally, the survey revealed that 28% of these 
executives plan to expand overseas rather than domestically, 23% plan to shift resources 
away from growth, 34% plan to pass costs on to consumers, 23% plan to try to raise 
additional capital, and 23% plan to reduce staff or hire less in order to offset the MDET. Id. 
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C. Counterarguments in Favor of the MDET 
Despite the evidence of corporate actions in preparation for the MDET, those in 
favor of the tax respond that the industry’s grave predictions of vast layoffs and 
decreased investment in innovation are greatly exaggerated. First, advocates of the 
MDET claim the industry studies are not based on “reasonable assumptions” 
because they overstate companies’ incentives to move offshore and ignore the 
positive effects on demand created by the PPACA.124 Because the tax applies 
equally to imported and domestically produced devices, proponents urge that the 
tax will not force manufacturers overseas.125 They also argue that the medical 
device industry is not being singled out since the tax is just one of many new levies 
imposed on sectors that will gain business due to health reform.126 Finally, 
advocates contend that the tax will not decrease innovation in the industry because 
“[g]overnment pressure to lower healthcare costs could . . . forc[e] developed 
nations to turn to innovative technology to achieve better results at lower costs.”127  
Supporters of the tax claim it is not the MDET causing employers to lay off 
employees and move jobs overseas but rather other factors related to medical 
regulations and the economy in general that have caused these shifts.128 These 
proponents point out that many companies, while blaming the MDET in part for 
their economic difficulties, acknowledge that other factors contribute and may play 
an even greater role. When Stryker Corporation revealed plans to cut 1000 workers, 
or five percent of its workforce, it cited the tax as only one cause behind its 
decision, and also pointed to other restructuring aims “to allow for continued 
investment in strategic areas and drive growth despite the ongoing challenging 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. Flavelle, supra note 109. 
 125. VAN DE WATER, supra note 25, at 3. 
 126. Id. at 1. In an interview that aired on December 13, 2012, President Obama 
explained:  
The health care bill is going to provide those health care companies, 30 million 
new customers. It’s going to be great for business and they’re doing really well 
right now and they’re going to get 30 million more customers as a consequence, 
so this additional tax essentially comes back to them as new customers. . . . The 
idea is that when you have 30 million more people coming in, you’re going to 
make money, you can do a little more to help facilitate and make sure people 
are getting the health care they need. 
Full Transcript of Frank Vascellaro’s Interview with Obama, CBS MINN. (Dec. 13, 2012, 
5:37 PM), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2012/12/13/full-transcript-of-frank-vascellaros
-interview-with-obama/ [hereinafter Vascellaro Interview]. 
 127. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION SCORECARD: 
THE RACE FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 12 (2011), available at http://download.pwc.com
/ie/pubs/2011_medical_technology_innovation_scorecard_the_race_for_global_leadership
_jan.pdf.  
 128. VAN DE WATER, supra note 25, at 4 (“[T]he effect of the excise tax on the medical 
device industry will be ‘trivial compared with other shifts,’ such as ‘scandals, recalls, stingy 
customers, [and] anxious regulators,’ all of which have left the industry in a ‘rut.’” (quoting 
Left to Their Own Devices: Medtronic and the Woes of America’s Medical-Technology 
Industry, ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/21528644)). 
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economic environment and market slowdown for elective procedures.”129 Welch 
Allyn also stated that its layoffs were spurred not only from preparation for the 
MDET but also in preparation for “significant changes driven by health-care reform 
and market dynamics.”130 Some analysts state that regardless of the MDET, the 
industry would have had to cut jobs due to “weak sales for the last several years as 
people lost their jobs and health insurance, and as cash-strapped governments 
around the world slashed spending.”131 To be fair, some medical device companies 
may have used the MDET as a scapegoat for cutting employees or shifting 
production overseas when those decisions may have been made regardless of the 
MDET; however, it is also possible that the MDET was the final nail in the coffin 
in favor of such operating decisions. 
MDET proponents also argue that the excise tax will not disproportionately 
affect small businesses because the bulk of the burden will fall on the large firms 
that account for the lion’s share of revenue in the industry. The industry has 
estimated revenue of $106–$116 billion per year,132 with approximately ten 
manufacturers accounting for eighty-six percent of the sales of covered medical 
devices.133 Large manufacturers such as Medtronic, Baxter International, and 
Boston Scientific will therefore pay the bulk of the tax.134 This analysis fails to take 
into account that although these large firms may pay the bulk of the tax, the smaller 
firms with low profit margins would feel the impact of even a small portion of the 
tax more acutely than large firms.135 Concededly, large manufacturers likely can 
absorb the tax with little difficulty: their stock prices continued to rise in 2013 
despite the excise tax.136 However, small, private manufacturers’ earnings are not 
reflected in these statistics, and it is likely these manufacturers cannot handle such a 
tax without changing business practices significantly or taking massive blows to 
their bottom lines. 
Finally, most of the supporters of the MDET view it as a necessary component 
of the PPACA—a small component that needs to remain intact in order to achieve 
the much larger goal of providing healthcare to all Americans. They acknowledge 
that the MDET imposes a burden on the medical device industry but reason that 
such a burden is outweighed by the benefits of Obamacare. Under Obamacare, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 129. Stryker Press Release, supra note 112; Yvonne Zipp, Stryker Corp. to Complete 
Planned Layoffs of 1,000 Workers by End of 2012, MLIVE (Nov. 19, 2012, 2:34 PM) 
http://www.mlive.com/business/west-michigan/index.ssf/2012/11/stryker_corp_to_complete
_layof.html. 
 130. Verespej, supra note 113. 
 131. Debra Sherman, Analysis: Medtech Companies Face Job Cuts, Excise Tax or Not, 
REUTERS, Dec. 20, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/20
/us-medtech-idUSBRE8BJ15U20121220. Frost & Sullivan analyst Venkat Rajan stated, “It’s 
easy to blame the tax, but it’s something that would have happened eventually at these 
companies.” Id. 
 132. VAN DE WATER, supra note 25, at 2–3; Flavelle, supra note 109. 
 133. MassDevice Staff, supra note106. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. The S&P Health Care Equipment Index rose over thirty percent in 2013. See S&P 
Health Care Equipment Select Industry Index, S&P DOW JONES INDICES, 
http://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-healthcare-equipment-select-industry-index.  
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millions of otherwise uninsured Americans will have access to affordable health 
insurance.137 Proponents of Obamacare and the MDET emphasize all of the 
positive impacts of the new health care law, such as prohibiting health insurers 
from denying coverage to individuals with preexisting conditions,138 ensuring the 
quality of care through new care reports and compliance,139 creating affordable 
insurance choices through state health insurance exchanges,140 prohibiting insurers 
from rescinding coverage,141 eliminating lifetime limits on insurance coverage,142 
and providing free preventive care benefits,143 to name just a few.144 However, 
these benefits do not justify charging a disproportionate amount of the costs of 
Obamacare to medical device manufacturers who will not receive a comparable 
increase in revenue due to new patients.145 Many proponents of the PPACA 
recognize this problem and oppose the MDET, acknowledging that the negative 
economic results of the MDET likely outweigh the portion of funding of the 
PPACA that the tax provides.146 
IV. POLITICAL UPROAR 
The outcry over the MDET caused the legislature to take action. On January 25, 
2011, bills were introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate to 
repeal the MDET.147 The Senate bill, the Medical Device Access and Innovation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Facts on the Affordable Care Act, OBAMACARE FACTS, http://obamacarefacts.com
/obamacare-facts.php. 
 138. PPACA §§ 1201(2)(A), (4), 1501(a)(2)(I), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-3(a), -4(a), 18091(2)(I) 
(2012). 
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(a)(1). 
 140. Id. § 18031(b)–(d). 
 141. Id. §§ 300gg-11 to -12.  
 142. Id. § 300gg-11(a)(1)(A), -11 note. 
 143. Id. § 300gg-13(a)(1)–(5). 
 144. For a helpful summary of key provisions of the PPACA, see Hyman, supra note 4. 
 145. See infra notes 170–80. Furthermore, although some manufacturers may be able to pass 
the tax on to healthcare providers, it is unlikely that most manufacturers will be willing or able to 
pass on the bulk of the tax. See, e.g., Evan Bayh, ObamaCare’s Tax Raid on Medical Devices, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2012, at A17 (explaining that “[b]ecause many devices are sold to 
hospitals, physicians and other providers through multiyear contracts, the prices are already 
locked in, so the tax cannot be passed on to the buyer”); Debra Sherman, Trade Group Identifies 
Medical Device Makers Passing on Federal Tax, REUTERS, Feb. 28, 2013, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/28/us-devices-tax-idUSBRE91R1NK20130228 (stating 
that the practice of charging the MDET as a line item on invoices is happening, but does not 
seem to be a broad or widespread practice, and “since so few companies are listed thus far, it’s 
not out of the question that their cost-shifting effort will backfire in terms of their relationships 
with GPOs and hospitals” (quoting Amit Hazan, an analyst at SunTrust Robinson Humphrey)). 
 146. For example, some of the biggest Obamacare advocates in Congress staunchly oppose 
the MDET despite their support of healthcare reform as a whole. Typically these congressmen 
and women are from states where medical device manufacturing is a big driver of the state’s 
economy. 
 147. Medical Device Access and Innovation Protection Act, S. 17, 112th Cong. (as 
introduced in the Senate, Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS
-112s17is/pdf/BILLS-112s17is.pdf; Protect Medical Innovation Act of 2011, H.R. 436, 112th 
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Protection Act, obtained thirty-three cosponsors but ultimately died.148 The House 
bill, titled the Protect Medical Innovation Act (PMIA) of 2011, was referred to the 
Committee on Ways and Means, which, after a mark-up session, reported in favor 
of the bill by a vote of twenty-three to eleven,149 stating, “The Committee believes 
that the tax will increase the cost of healthcare, slow medical innovation, and lead 
to loss of jobs in the industry.”150 The PMIA of 2011 was consolidated with three 
other related bills151 into a bill called the Health Care Cost Reduction Act of 2012 
(HCCRA).152 The House of Representatives voted to pass this bill on June 7, 
2012,153 but it could not get through the Democrat-controlled Senate, likely because 
of the controversial “pay-for” mechanism designed to recapture overpaid health 
insurance tax credits to families.154 President Obama had also vowed to veto the bill 
even if it had passed the Senate.155  
                                                                                                                 
Cong. (as introduced in the House, Jan. 25, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg
/BILLS-112hr436ih/pdf/BILLS-112hr436ih.pdf. 
 148. S. 17 (112th): Medical Device Access and Innovation Protection Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s17. The bill was reintroduced in February 2013; it 
gained thirty-nine cosponsors but once again stalled in committee. S. 232: Medical Device 
Access and Innovation Protection Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress
/bills/113/s232. 
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 112-514, pt. 3, at 5 (2012). 
 150. Id. pt. 2, at 5. 
 151. The other three bills included in the consolidated H.R. 436 were the Restoring Access 
to Medications Act of 2012, H.R. 5842; the Health Flexible Spending Arrangements 
Improvements Act of 2012, H.R. 1004; and the Reconciliation Recommendation Related to the 
Recapture of Overpayments Resulting from Certain Federally Subsidized Health Insurance. 
Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to David Dreier, Chairman, 
Comm. on Rules, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (June 5, 2012), available at 
http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/hr436_0.pdf. 
 152. Health Care Cost Reduction Act of 2012, H.R. 436, 112th Cong. (as passed by House, 
June 7, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr436eh/pdf/BILLS
-112hr436eh.pdf. 
 153. H.R. 436 (112th): Health Care Cost Reduction Act of 2012, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr436 (detailing timeline of bill’s path through 
House). 
 154. Id. It is clear that members of the House knew when passing the bill that the Senate 
would not agree to the pay-for provision. See 158 CONG. REC. H3611 (daily ed. June 7, 2012) 
(statement of Rep. Watt) (“We need . . . to repeal the medical devices tax. But this is not the 
way to pay for it, and we must find an acceptable pay-for.”); 158 CONG. REC. H3610 (daily ed. 
June 7, 2012) (statement of Rep. King) (“I support the legislation before us today, but I do so 
under the proviso and with the understanding that the pay-for that is being used right now is 
controversial on our side. I don’t think it’s the ideal pay-for. I don't believe that it’s going to be 
the pay-for that the Senate would consider if it takes this measure up. It certainly won’t be the 
pay-for that the President will feel comfortable signing into law.”). For further discussion of the 
bill’s pay-for provision, see H.R. 436—Health Care Cost Reduction Act of 2012 (Paulsen, 
R-MN), LEGIS. BULL. (Republican Study Comm., Wash., D.C.), June 7, 2012, available at 
http://rsc.scalise.house.gov/uploadedfiles/lbhr436_medicaldevicetax_otcrepeal_fsa_reform
_06072012.pdf. 
 155. See Joseph Walker, Senate Democrats Seek Delay in Medical-Device Tax, WALL ST. J. 
WASH. WIRE (Dec. 10, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/12/10/senate
-democrats-seek-delay-in-medical-device-tax/; see also H.R. 436—Health Care Cost Reduction 
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As the effective date of the tax drew near, opponents continued to write letters 
urging Congress to take action before the January 1, 2013, implementation date. On 
November 13, 2012, over eight hundred organizations and businesses signed a letter 
to the majority and minority leaders of the Senate encouraging Congress to add 
repeal of the MDET to its list of priorities.156 On December 4, 2012, eighteen 
Democratic senators also sent a letter to Senate majority leader Harry Reid 
requesting delayed enactment of the MDET, stating, “[W]e must do all we can to 
ensure that our country maintains its global leadership position in the medical 
technology industry and keeps good jobs here at home.”157 Despite such opposition 
even from supporters of Obamacare overall, Congress refused to delay enactment of 
the MDET, and the tax took effect as planned on January 1, 2013.  
Opponents have not given up hope, however, and continue to lobby Congress for 
prompt repeal of the tax. On February 6, 2013, Erik Paulsen introduced to the House 
of Representatives the PMIA of 2013, another bill to repeal the MDET.158 The bill 
was referred to a committee for consideration, but again no fast action occurred. The 
main problem with this revised version of the repeal bill is that it lacks any pay-for 
provision. This is Democrats’ main sticking point, and passage of any bill without an 
offsetting revenue-generating provision to pay for Obamacare is improbable. On 
March 20, 2013, Representative Dan Maffei (D-N.Y.) introduced another bill to the 
House titled the Medical Device Tax Elimination Act.159 This bill would also repeal 
the MDET and contains a pay-for provision that may be more palatable to Democrats 
than the pay-for provision included in the HCCRA.160 Maffei’s bill would fully offset 
the cost of repealing the MDET by wiping out three current tax incentives for large 
oil companies.161 As of the writing of this Note, Maffei’s bill has only six 
cosponsors162 while Paulsen’s PMIA of 2013 has rounded up 271, enough to pass the 
                                                                                                                 
Act of 2012 (Paulsen, R-MN), supra note 154, at 2; Vascellaro Interview, supra note 126.  
 156. Letter from 800 groups, supra note 97. 
 157. Letter from eighteen U.S. Democratic senators, supra note 93. 
 158. Protect Medical Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 523, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr523ih/pdf/BILLS-113hr523ih.pdf. The Medical 
Device Access and Innovation Protection Act was also reintroduced to the Senate on 
February 7, 2013, but passage seems unlikely. Medical Device Access and Innovation 
Protection Act, S. 232, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/BILLS-113s232is/pdf/BILLS-113s232is.pdf; S. 232: Medical Device Access and 
Innovation Protection Act, supra note 148. 
 159.  Medical Device Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 1295, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr1295ih/pdf/BILLS-113hr1295ih.pdf. 
 160. See supra note 154. 
 161. The bill proposes to (1) eliminate the section 199 domestic production activities 
deduction for oil companies, which is expected to generate $9 billion over 2014–23; (2) ban oil 
companies from using the Last-In, First-Out (LIFO) method of accounting for inventory that 
allows companies to deduct the cost of oil most recently added to their inventories, which is 
expected to generate $14 billion; and (3) ban oil companies from claiming foreign tax credits, 
which is expected to generate $6 billion.  Press Release, Dan Maffei, U.S. Congressman, 
Maffei Introduces Legislation to Repeal Medical Device Tax (Mar. 20, 2013), available at 
http://maffei.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/maffei-introduces-legislation-to-repeal
-medical-device-tax. 
 162.  Medical Device Tax Elimination Act, H.R. 1296, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1295. 
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House and approaching a two-thirds majority.163 If the PMIA of 2013 were to pass 
the House, the Senate may be more receptive than it was the first time around. On 
March 21, 2013, the Senate voted in favor of repealing the MDET seventy-nine to 
twenty in a largely symbolic, nonbinding vote.164 The overwhelming bipartisan 
support demonstrated by this nonbinding vote reveals the discontent of legislators and 
sets the stage for true repeal, according to Indiana Senator Dan Coats.165  
Opponents of the tax became hopeful in the fall of 2013 when repeal of the 
MDET became one of the main sticking points in the congressional negotiations to 
end the government shutdown.166 The repeal of the tax seemed to be one of very few 
issues with bipartisan support167 and a way for Republicans to whittle away at the 
President’s healthcare law; however, Senate Democrats (despite prior efforts to 
repeal the tax) refused to include repeal as part of a larger budget agreement. The 
MDET thus remains intact for now, with members of Congress, medical device 
industry spokespeople and lobbyists still pushing for repeal as part of larger tax 
reform negotiations set to take place in 2014.168 With the tax having been in effect 
                                                                                                                 
 
 163. Protect Medical Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 523, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr523. 
 164. The vote was nonbinding because it concerned an amendment to a Senate budget 
resolution, cosponsored by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), that 
is unlikely to be accepted by the Republican-controlled House. E.g., Tom Curry, Senate Votes to 
Kill Part of 2010 Health Care Overhaul, NBCNEWS.COM (Mar. 22, 2013, 9:18 AM), 
http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/22/17414901-senate-votes-to-kill-part-of-2010
-health-care-overhaul?lite. 
 165. Arezu Sarvestani, Medical Device Tax: Senate Repeal Vote Was More Than Symbolic, 
Says Indiana Sen. Coats, MASSDEVICE (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.massdevice.com
/news/medical-device-tax-senate-repeal-vote-was-more-symbolic-says-indiana-sen-coats. 
The nonbinding vote also demonstrates the significant lobbying power of the medical device 
manufacturing industry. Since the announcement of the MDET, medical device makers have 
been throwing money at legislators in an effort to win support for repeal of the tax. Based on 
data collected by the Center for Responsive Politics, medical device makers have spent about 
$30 million annually on lobbying efforts for the last five years. Medical Devices & Supplies: 
Lobbying, 2012, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/industries
/lobbying.php?cycle=2012&ind=H4100. 
 166. See, e.g., Alex Nussbaum & Michelle Fay Cortez, Medical Device-Tax Delay Turns 
Focus of U.S. Budget Fight, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2013, 12:45 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-15/medical-device-tax-delay-turns-focus-of-u-s
-budget-fight.html. The government shutdown lasted from October 1 through October 16, 2013. 
 167. Bipartisan support can be attributed to the broad distribution of medical device 
manufacturers across the nation, in both Republican and Democratic areas, who have been 
pressuring their representatives to repeal the tax. See, e.g., Ezra Klein, This Is Why the Medical 
Device Tax Is in So Much Trouble, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013, 4:35 PM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/14/this-is-why-the-medical
-device-tax-is-in-so-much-trouble/. According to a 2010 study by the Lewin Group, the top five 
states with the highest percentages of employment in the medical technology industry are 
Minnesota (1.06%), Utah (0.93%), Delaware (0.79%), Massachusetts (0.78%), and Indiana 
(0.75%). See LEWIN GRP., supra note 95, at 6. 
 168. See, e.g., Maureen Groppe, Effort Continues to Repeal Medical Device Tax, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 27, 2013, 12:22 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013
/10/27/medical-device-tax-repeal/3189315/. 
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for only a year, the actual impact of the tax and the possibility of repeal still remain 
in question.169  
V. REPEAL OR REVISION OF THE MDET 
Although it is unlikely that the MDET is the sole cause of medical companies’ 
decisions to lay off employees or shift production overseas, or that the tax will kill 
the American medical device industry, medical device manufacturers and lobbyists 
have good reason to continue urging repeal. This Part first argues that the MDET is 
unwise tax and economic policy that should never have been implemented and 
should now be repealed for three reasons. First, and most importantly, the 
reasoning behind inclusion of the MDET as a revenue generator for Obamacare is 
based on flawed assumptions that were not thoroughly investigated. Congress and 
the President failed to comprehensively analyze the expected increased revenue 
device manufacturers would receive from additional insured individuals. In fact, 
there is no evidence that manufacturers will receive much, if any, benefit. Second, 
the nature of excise taxes does not fit with the complexity of the medical device 
industry’s supply chain and leads to unnecessary and extremely burdensome 
administrative costs that Congress has failed to consider sufficiently. Finally, the 
tax does not comport with sound economic policy and serves to discourage the type 
of job creation and innovation the Obama administration has been pushing for. 
But because total repeal seems doubtful in the near future, this Part concludes by 
providing an alternative to complete repeal. Such an alternative would focus on 
removing some of the most burdensome portions of the MDET by (1) exempting 
start-ups from the tax for a certain period of time in order to encourage small 
start-ups to continue investing in research and development of innovative medical 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. Some medical device companies’ stock prices have continued to rise in 2013 despite 
the start of the MDET, but it is unclear whether this trend will continue. See, e.g., Russ Britt, 
Despite Bipartisan Howls, Medical-Device Tax Persists, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 22, 2014, 
9:32 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-obamacare-tax-that-nobody-wants-2014
-01-22?pagenumber=1. A survey by Emergo Group, a leading medical device consulting 
company, revealed that the MDET did not have quite as negative an impact as expected. 
EMERGO GRP., GLOBAL MEDICAL DEVICE INDUSTRY OUTLOOK FOR 2014, at 18–19 (2014) (In 
2013, 53% of firms surveyed predicted a “somewhat negative” or “very negative” impact 
and 27% expected “no impact”; in 2014, after one year of the tax, only 45% of the same 
managers reported that the MDET actually had a “somewhat negative” or “very negative” 
impact, and 34% said it had “no impact.” Fifty percent of respondents said they made no 
significant changes in response to the MDET.). A study by AdvaMed shows a bleaker 
picture, reporting that as a result of the MDET, 30.6% of respondents reduced R&D, almost 
10% relocated or expanded manufacturing abroad rather than in the United States, and 75% 
reported other negative impacts such as deferring or cancelling capital investments, reducing 
investment in start-ups, or reducing or deferring increases in employee compensation. The 
study extrapolates that the total job impact was approximately 33,000; however, these results 
were based on a survey of just thirty-eight companies. ADVAMED, IMPACT OF THE MEDICAL 
DEVICE EXCISE TAX (2014), available at http://advamed.org/res.download/417; Press 
Release, AdvaMed, New Survey Reveals Real World Impact of Medical Device Tax (Feb. 
18, 2014), available at http://advamed.org/news/89/new-survey-reveals-real-world-impact
-of-medical-device-tax. 
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devices; (2) exempting otherwise taxable devices (such as product samples, 
demonstration products, and evaluation products) when they are not used in a 
taxable manner; (3) adopting the IRS’s interim guidance regarding convenience 
kits and constructive sales pricing; and (4) revising the tax rate after the first couple 
years of the tax’s existence to more accurately reflect the increase in revenue 
medical device manufacturers of various device categories receive as a result of the 
increased number of insured Americans. 
A. An Unfair Burden Based on Flawed Assumptions 
When deciding to impose a tax or fee on medical device manufacturers, 
Congress reasoned that these manufacturers would benefit from an increased 
customer base due to the sweeping coverage of Obamacare.170 However, no studies 
were ever conducted to analyze whether this increased coverage would actually 
increase manufacturers’ revenue, and if so, by how much.171 Congress appears to 
have just decided upon a revenue amount that it needed to reach, and the MDET 
was part of the “revenue grab.”172 
According to most medical device manufacturers, the belief that the PPACA 
will increase medical device sales due to an increased customer base is misplaced 
because the newly insured individuals generally are not those who require most 
medical devices subject to the MDET.173 As Cook Medical Chairman Steve 
Ferguson stated: 
[W]hen you look at the basic population that [Congress] wanted [the 
PPACA] to cover, those are not people who use our products. They’re 
not people who have GI problems, because almost all of the medical 
problems are age-related except those that occur in major traffic 
accidents or those other types of issues. . . . [E]ven if you look at that 
younger patient that may have picked up insurance under ObamaCare, 
if they’re in a car accident and they’re rushed via ambulance to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 171. See Letter from 800 groups, supra note 97; NELSON, supra note 110. A review of the 
congressional record and committee reports indicates that no financial studies were done to 
assess the benefit medical device manufacturers might receive from the increased number of 
insured individuals. Although such an economic analysis could lead to highly diverging 
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manufacturers with the projected number of newly insured individuals ought to have been 
made. 
 172. See Letter from 800 groups, supra note 97; NELSON, supra note 110 
 173. See Letter from 800 groups, supra note 97; see also MATT DOLAN, ROTH CAPITAL 
PARTNERS, FULL REPORT: INNOVATION 101—TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION IN THE MEDICAL 
DEVICE INDUSTRY 4–5 (2012), available at http://www.roth.com/files/marketing
/email_blasts/Roth%20Capital%20CONNECT.pdf (finding 88% of uninsured patients are 
under fifty-five years old, while only 2% are over sixty-five years old: in stark contrast, the 
average age of patients receiving five common medical devices, such as cardiac stents, knee 
replacements, and heart valves, ranges from sixty to over seventy-five). 
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local hospital, they’re going to be covered regardless of whether they 
have insurance or not.174  
This belief has been echoed by much of the industry. The December 2012 
AdvaMed study on the impact of the MDET revealed that, based on the eighty-one 
companies surveyed, 80% expect less than a 1% increase in revenue from new 
customers and 90% expect less than a 2% increase.175 Although some proponents 
of the tax believe certain sectors of the medical device manufacturing industry may 
benefit from the number of newly insured individuals because many more people 
will opt to have elective surgeries, such as hip or knee replacements,176 this 
argument is pure conjecture—the same type of conjecture relied upon by the 
drafters of the MDET. 
Some of the only hard evidence available on the PPACA’s potential impact on 
medical device sales comes from Massachusetts, a state that enacted a healthcare 
law similar to the PPACA in 2006.177 In Massachusetts, there has been no evidence 
that medical device manufacturers have realized any increase in sales as a result of 
expanded healthcare coverage,178 and some sources indicate that Massachusetts 
manufacturers actually saw a decrease in growth compared to the rest of the United 
States.179 Such evidence indicates that the whole reasoning behind imposing the 
MDET to help cover the costs of the PPACA is likely misplaced. If the medical 
device industry will receive very minimal, if any, increases in revenue due to the 
increased number of insured Americans, then burdening the industry with over $2 
billion annually in MDET becomes a punitive measure that not only punishes 
industry participants, but also hurts the entire U.S. economy. As NuVasive CEO 
Alex Lukianov put it, “The goal of Health Care reform is to ensure that the best 
medical solutions are applied in the most efficient and cost-effective ways, not to 
penalize the companies that contribute to better healthcare & healthier more 
productive lives.”180 This is precisely what the MDET does—it places a tax on one 
of the industries that could help decrease healthcare costs through innovation.  
B. An Inappropriate Tax for a Complicated Industry 
The cost of paying the MDET is not the only burden placed on device 
manufacturers. The actual cost of the MDET is significantly greater than 2.3% of 
the gross sales of devices due to very high administrative and compliance costs. 
Even the IRS recognizes that the industry will face compliance costs181—as is the 
case with any new tax—but imposing an excise tax on such a complicated supply 
                                                                                                                 
 
 174. NELSON, supra note 110. 
 175. ADVAMED SURVEY, Dec. 2012, supra note 82. 
 176. See Groppe, supra note 168. 
 177. Act of Apr. 12, 2006, ch. 58, 2006 Mass. Acts. 
 178. See Letter from 800 groups, supra note 97. 
 179. DOLAN, supra note 173, at 6–8 (“8 out of 9 companies experienced negative or 
neutral comparative growth rates in Massachusetts as compared to the rest of the US 
following the implementation of universal health care in that state.”). 
 180. Lukianov statement, supra note 118. 
 181. T.D. 9604, 2012-52 I.R.B. 740. 
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chain poses more unique problems and additional burdens for manufacturers and 
importers than a characteristic excise tax. The calculation of the sales price is much 
more complicated for the MDET than for the typical excise tax because the 
industry is newer, less integrated, and comprised of very complex distribution 
channels.182 Even after several months of paying the tax, companies noted they 
were still struggling to understand exactly how to calculate the sales price and were 
likely overpaying.183 The fact that only interim guidance, and not final regulations, 
has been released addressing how to calculate sales price further indicates that even 
experts find it difficult to create a workable taxing scheme that fairly and accurately 
taxes the correct items, at the correct price, in such a complex industry.  
The complexity of complying with the tax places an even greater burden on 
smaller firms that do not have the money to hire experts to decipher the tax and 
therefore must divert personnel from productive jobs to compliance positions.184 
Not only will small companies and start-ups feel the financial burden of the tax 
more than the medical manufacturing giants, but they will also struggle more to 
implement and understand the tax. In sum, the administrative burdens of the tax, 
especially for smaller firms, can greatly increase the cost of the tax to the economy. 
When the costs of compliance make up a substantial portion of a tax’s total cost, it 
is inherently inefficient.  
C. Failure to Comport With Current Ideas of Sound Economic Policy 
Furthermore, in a struggling U.S. economy where the focus has been on 
domestic job creation,185 imposing a new tax burden on one of the leading 
job-creating industries goes against intelligent economic policy. A 2011 study by 
McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) found that in order to revive U.S. job creation, 
progress must be made in four dimensions: (1) development of the U.S. 
workforce’s skills to match what employers are looking for; (2) expansion of 
U.S. workers’ share of global economic growth by attracting foreign investment 
and spurring exports; (3) support of emerging industries and new business start-
ups; and (4) speeding-up of regulatory decision making that hinders business 
expansion and new investment.186 This same report notes that “[h]ealth care is 
pivotal, with the potential to create more than 5 million new jobs. . . . [Achieving 
the high-job-growth scenario] assumes that innovative approaches in primary care, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. Kyle Pomerleau, Obamacare Medical Device Tax Still Baffling Business, TAX 
FOUND. TAX POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 20, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/blog/obamacare-medical
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 185. Although the average unemployment rate has been steadily decreasing from a high 
of 10% in October 2009 to 7.8% in November 2012, getting Americans back to work 
remains a priority. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. BUREAU 
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chronic disease management, and geriatric care would create new jobs.”187 
Unfortunately, the MDET does exactly the opposite of MGI’s recommendations for 
achieving a high-job-growth scenario. The MDET deters new medical device 
manufacturing start-ups by imposing on them a tax on gross revenues regardless of 
profits. In an industry that already struggles due to the FDA and CMS’s slow 
regulatory decision making,188 the MDET adds yet another barrier to entry into the 
industry. Finally, it forces medical device manufacturers to look abroad to more 
business-friendly countries for expansion opportunities189—exactly the opposite of 
what should be happening. 
Put simply, imposition of the MDET requires one of America’s strongest 
job-creating industries to cut spending on jobs, new investment, and R&D in order 
to pay for a health care system from which it will receive few, if any, added 
benefits. For these reasons, Congress would be wise to repeal this tax before 
companies cut more jobs, decrease their investment in innovation, and spend more 
money and valuable time investing in compliance measures. 
D. Ways to Decrease the Burden Without Complete Repeal 
Since complete repeal of the MDET appears unlikely at this point, this subpart 
briefly examines a few small changes that could mitigate the harmful effects of the 
MDET. The following recommendations are not the only options for changing the 
tax, and such changes would not combat all of the negative effects of the MDET 
like a complete repeal, but they would be a good start. The changes would 
undoubtedly decrease the revenue generated by the tax, but they would not wipe 
out all revenue generated by this sector and would represent a compromise between 
the two sides of the debate over the MDET. The difference in revenue could be 
made up by tweaking some of the other provisions of the PPACA or by closing 
unrelated tax loopholes through comprehensive tax reform similar to 
Representative Maffei’s Medical Device Tax Elimination Act proposed in 
March.190 This subpart does not seek to comprehensively lay out all of the 
intricacies of each proposal—it is merely included to highlight some possible areas 
for compromise to spur further discussion. 
First, in order to encourage small start-up medical technology companies with 
innovative ideas to invest in R&D, the MDET could contain an exemption for 
start-up companies for a certain time period or until they become profitable. Since 
start-up companies account for much of the new innovation in the industry and 
typically produce very low profit margins or operate at a loss, imposing a new tax 
that eats up 2.3% of their profit margins makes no sense. Such a measure will deter 
start-ups from investing in new technology and will hurt innovation and job 
creation. The MDET could be amended to exempt start-up companies from the tax 
for a specified number of years—perhaps seven to ten, the average product 
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development life cycle191—or until they reach a preset level of profitability, 
whichever happens first.  
Such an exemption would also be in line with the legislature’s intent. When 
originally imposed, the MDET was designed as an annual fee that would primarily 
hit the largest companies.192 By exempting start-ups from the MDET, Congress 
would be returning to the original rationale behind the MDET and would avoid 
discouraging further start-up companies with innovative ideas from entering the 
industry in the United States.  
Second, certain uses of otherwise taxable medical devices should qualify them 
for an exemption from the MDET. Such exemptions should include products that 
are used for testing, development, and evaluation, as well as those that function as 
samples, demonstration devices, donations, or replacements provided to customers 
free of charge. These uses do not confer any direct benefit to the manufacturer.193 
Free samples, demonstration products, testing and development products, and 
donations further innovation and affordable access to health care by providing the 
means to instruct health care providers and patients in the correct use of the devices 
or by furthering important and necessary testing of devices. Although it is 
administratively simpler to apply the excise tax regardless of use, such application 
deters manufacturers from engaging in these very important and commonplace 
activities.  
Several industry groups and manufacturers requested these exemptions in 
comment letters to the IRS after release of the proposed regulations and requested 
comments.194 However, the IRS and Treasury Department expressly denied carving 
out most of these exceptions for uses195 in the final regulations, stating, “[I]t is 
necessary to have consistent rules for all manufacturers excise taxes.”196 The 
problem with this reasoning is that the MDET is not like other manufacturers’ 
excise taxes. The majority of manufacturers’ excise taxes are imposed on 
commodity items, such as cigarettes, alcohol, and gasoline, and serve to deter the 
purchase of such items.197 Medical devices do not resemble these commodity items 
and thus warrant distinct treatment. Although there are some instances in which 
ease and consistency in administration override other considerations, this is not one 
of them. These uses are important for the development, testing, and training of 
patients and healthcare professionals in proper use of new medical devices; 
therefore, Congress should not discourage such uses by subjecting the devices to 
the MDET. 
Third, the IRS should take the relatively uncontroversial move of adopting as 
final the interim guidance it issued regarding convenience kits and constructive 
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sales pricing. The interim guidance solves the problems of potential improper or 
double taxation of devices included in kits by excluding convenience kits from the 
definition of devices and instead imposing the tax at the component device level. 
This interim rule was a smart choice by the IRS and should be finalized in 
regulations. The interim guidance on calculating the constructive sales price based 
on varied distribution chains should also be adopted as final, adding any necessary 
revisions, based on industry participants’ comments and recommendations. This 
rule provides medical device manufacturers flexibility in complying with the 
MDET and takes into account the varied distribution chains that exist in the 
medical device industry. Thus, it would be appropriate for the IRS to incorporate 
the interim guidance in final regulations.  
Finally, section 4191 should contain a provision subjecting the MDET to 
adjustments as more information about its true impact becomes available. For 
example, if studies show that certain manufacturers (such as those who produce 
artificial hips and knees) receive a large ramp up in income as a result of the newly 
insured individuals covered under Obamacare who have chosen to undergo elective 
procedures, then perhaps the rate applied to certain devices should increase. 
Conversely, for those devices where it is clear that there has been little or no 
increase in sales as a result of additional insured people (such as defibrillators and 
stents), the rate should decrease to one that more accurately reflects the benefit such 
manufacturers receive. Although such an analysis will be difficult and undoubtedly 
subject to much scrutiny, it could help to achieve a fairer result.  
CONCLUSION 
As AdvaMed CEO Stephen Ubl stated, “The device tax no longer has anything 
to do with the debate over the Affordable Care Act; the issue now is whether our 
tax system is going to support or undermine America’s ability to compete in the 
global economy.”198 The MDET is a tax provision that goes against the primary 
economic goal of keeping and creating more clean, high-paying jobs in 
manufacturing.199 It punishes medical device manufacturers by forcing them to pay 
a tax at the top level, placing upon them one of the highest tax rates faced by any 
industry in the world.200 Since the tax applies at the top level to gross income, the 
true impact is actually an increase of 29% to the industry’s effective tax rate.201  
Congress included the MDET in the PPACA to generate revenue, hypothesizing 
that medical device manufacturers would experience significant revenue gains from 
the greater number of insured Americans, but without ever studying just how much 
benefit manufacturers would actually receive. Based on company surveys, the 
experience of Massachusetts, and logic as to who purchases such devices, that 
increase appears to be slight, if any. Furthermore, the complicated nature of the 
distribution channels and types of devices in the industry make an excise tax an 
overly burdensome and costly tax to implement. These compliance costs are an 
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overall loss to society and ought to have been more thoroughly considered by 
Congress before enacting the MDET. Therefore, Congress needs to revisit this 
provision and either repeal the MDET or, at a minimum, revise some of the most 
onerous parts, possibly by exempting start-ups, exempting certain uses, adopting 
the interim guidance on convenience kits and constructive pricing as final, and 
allowing for revision of the tax rate based on data gathered during the tax’s first 
few years of operation.  
As it stands now, the MDET will continue to cost the United States high-paying 
manufacturing jobs and will slowly lead to decreased innovation in the medical 
device industry. Congress should designate the MDET as a priority in its 2014 
discussions on tax reform in order to keep the U.S. medical device industry 
flourishing. 
